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Abstract
In contest settings, heterogeneity between contestants generally leads to low effort 
provision, and many instruments have been suggested to restore competitive bal-
ance. We suggest that heterogeneity may evolve depending upon the outcome of pre-
vious contests. Restoring competitive balance in this setting is challenging, and we 
consider the choice faced by a principal who can distribute a prize fund over two 
consecutive all-pay auction contests. Contestants are heterogeneous in the sense that 
one of them has a head start in the first contest. The winner of contest one gains the 
stage prize and a net head start in contest two; the size of this net head start also var-
ies between players. The head start of the early leader can be increased, neutralized 
or overturned. The principal aims to maximize total effort. We show how the poten-
tial head start that the initial underdog can gain is critical in determining expected 
efforts. When this parameter is small, the principal can do no better than running a 
single contest. When the initial underdog can catch up and surpass the first-contest 
favourite, there is scope to do better. Indeed, it is possible to completely neutralize 
the initial heterogeneity and capture all of the surplus from the players, inciting a 
level of expected effort equal to the prize value. Competitive balance is achieved by 
a judicious division of the prize budget.
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1 Introduction
Competitive situations are often characterized by the fact that winning breeds win-
ners, making success self-fulfilling. When competition is modelled as a contest, it 
has long been established that heterogeneity in the participants may lead to out-
comes involving low effort provision.1 Adding to this the fact that winners may 
evolve and gain further advantage in subsequent contests can exacerbate this prob-
lem. How then should an incentive scheme be organized to ensure that laggards do 
not simply give up, leaving the spoils to a superior competitor? In this paper, we 
discuss this question in a contest setting where a principal has a prize fund available 
and must choose whether to put all of it in a single contest or to spread it out over 
several contests. We assume a synergy between the contests which reflects the fact 
that success in a previous contest affects the likelihood of success in the current one. 
We find that the optimal prize division depends upon contestants’ heterogeneity, in 
particular on the interplay of their ex-ante heterogeneity and the difference in how 
they respond to an early win to affect that ex-ante heterogeneity. In a case with two 
participants, when one contestant’s ex-ante head start is small relative to the other 
contestant’s ability to use an early win to catch up with and even overtake the rival, 
the principal should spread the prize fund over more than one contest in order to 
maximize participants’ total expected efforts. Indeed, our most striking result is that 
the principal can, in some cases, use the prize division to even out the ex-ante het-
erogeneity between the contestants, capturing all of their surplus.
Contest theorists have been interested in how competitive balance can be 
improved in situations where contestants do not meet on a level playing field. Sev-
eral instruments have been considered, such as the form of the contest success func-
tion with different types of biases and/or differential taxation of rewards (Mealem 
and Nitzan 2016), adjusting the prize structure (Sisak 2009), and introducing limits 
on efforts (Che and Gale 1998). This levelling is needed in order to avoid the dis-
couragement effect where those lagging behind simply give up since this is detri-
mental to the interests of an effort-maximizing principal (Konrad 2012; Konrad and 
Kovenock 2009). The stage game that we consider is a complete-information all-pay 
auction with a head start, which can lead to a laggard giving up if the opponent’s 
head start is sufficiently large. This head start may reflect for example an incum-
bency advantage in political competition, a prior investment made by a player, or 
some technological superiority. When one player has a head-start advantage, he can 
expend effort at a lower level than the opponent and still win the prize.
In their model of a patent race, Fudenberg et al. (1983) show that an arbitrarily 
small lead will preclude competition as long as the favorite has an advantage at each 
stage. In order to achieve competition, it is necessary for a laggard to be able to leap-
frog the initial leader at some stage in the race.2 We utilize this in our two-contest 
1 See the comprehensive survey of Chowdhury et al. (2020).
2 Konrad and Kovenock (2010) show that the discouragement effect can be mitigated if abilities are not 
constant and are the outcome of a stochastic process. This implies that there are stages of the contest in 
which the underdog may be a favorite.
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competition, by assuming that the winner of the first contest receives a boost or 
momentum before the second one. If the player with the ex-ante head start wins the 
first contest, then he augments this head start before the second one; if the initial 
laggard wins contest one, then he reduces the head start of the leader, and may even 
get a head start himself. The momentum created by a win in contest one may be due 
to the physiological or psychological effects of winning, or due to increased access 
to material resources. Our model also captures the possibility that a win by the ini-
tially favored player may give him a lower head start in the second contest than the 
first; the win still ensures a head start to the player, but of lower magnitude. This 
could be caused by fatigue, for example, which has been investigated theoretically 
by Ryvkin (2011) and experimentally by Angelova et al. (2020).
The “ winner effect” has been well documented in biology, with the male of a 
species experiencing an increase in the testosterone level following a win in a (terri-
torial or survival) contest, while the loser has a reduced level of testosterone (Chase 
et  al. 1994). Hence, the winner is in better physiological shape to compete in the 
next contest, as documented in male judo competitions by Cohen-Zada et al. (2017) 
and in male tennis competitions by Page and Coates (2017) and Gauriot and Page 
(2019). Rather than affecting the physiology of competitors, a successful contestant 
may gain a psychological boost (Krumer 2013). Batters in baseball perceive the ball 
as bigger when they have had recent success in hitting, for instance (Witt and Proffitt 
2005). The case for the existence of psychological momentum is persuasively made 
by Iso-Ahola and Dotson (2014), who evaluate previous attempts to identify this 
phenomenon in sports and other contexts. On the other hand, successful players in 
some competitions may gain access to material goods that make competing easier. 
In sales-force management, more successful agents may be given less administrative 
duties, better access to back-office resources, more training than the less success-
ful, and better territories; see, e.g., Skiera and Albers (1998), Farrell and Hakstian 
(2001), and Krishnamoorthy et al. (2005).
The phenomenon that winning creates winners may be recognized by scientists 
who compete for research grants. As noted by Gallini and Scotchmer (2002; p. 54): 
“ [F]uture grants are contingent upon previous success. The linkage between previ-
ous success and future funding seems even more specific in the case of the National 
Science Council” . Those who succeed in obtaining research grants may experience 
an increase in status, winning a grant to fund current work and build up a compe-
tent research team, which again improves their chance of winning further grants. 
Losing teams must use time and resources in seeking presumably inferior forms of 
funding; in sum, this gives an advantage in future rounds of competition for scarce 
research funding. Strumpf (2002) suggests that in political competitions, the win-
ner of a first election round may gain additional media attention and funding from 
campaign contributors, which helps to build future momentum. Mehlum and Moene 
(2016) note that incumbency can be a source of advantage in the current situation, 
and in the future. These can be seen as examples of the Matthew effect, coined by 
Merton (1968) to describe situations in which the rich get richer or where success 
breeds success. An initial advantage can be self-amplifying, and such mechanisms 
are prevalent whether we consider “ economic wealth, political power, prestige, 
knowledge, or in fact any other scarce or valued resource” (Perc 2014; p. 1). Faced 
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with a contestant with initial advantage, it may seem likely that the laggard will give 
up. How might the principal divide his prize fund to mitigate this effect? We show 
that the answer depends on the size of the initial advantage, and how this advantage 
evolves; there is no guarantee that the initial leader will maintain the advantage in 
the future. In his extensive review of the Matthew effect, Rigney (Rigney 2010; p. 
1) states that “[i]nitial advantage does not always lead to further advantage, and ini-
tial disadvantage does not always lead to further disadvantage”. By allowing for the 
possibility that an initially disadvantaged player can catch up and surpass the initial 
leader, we show that the principal can incite the contestants to exert so much effort 
that they dissipate the whole value of the prize.
Our modeling choices and analysis are based on two premises which feature 
prominently in the contest literature: a stage game consisting of a complete-informa-
tion two-player all-pay auction with a head start, and the principal wishing to maxi-
mize the total expected level of effort. Head starts in a single contest have been ana-
lyzed by several authors, notably by Konrad (2002), Meirowitz (2008), Kirkegaard 
(2012), Li and Yu (2012), Hirata (2014), Segev and Sela (2014), Siegel (2014), and 
Franke et al. (2018). Among these papers, Konrad (2002) and Hirata (2014) discuss 
two-stage situations where players can take actions in the first stage that create head 
starts in the second stage, while Li and Yu (2012) and Franke et al. (2018) discuss 
the principal’s optimal choice of head start in a single contest in order to maximize 
expected effort. Our framework differs from these approaches: it is not the actions in 
the first round that determine the head start in the second, rather it is the act of win-
ning, and the boost that this provides. Also, the principal in our model controls the 
budget division, and not the head start advantage held by a player. While there exist 
cases where the principal may legitimately give a head start to a contestant, affirma-
tive action being one, there are other cases where granting a head start may not be 
deemed feasible. One such case is the running of a research contest in which favorit-
ism is difficult. Here, the principal must use the budget division in lieu of a more 
direct instrument to balance the competition.
With two players and a single contest, Li and Yu (2012) show that the optimal 
head start is given to the player with the lower valuation at an amount equal to the 
difference between the valuations of the two players. This shifts the stronger player’s 
equilibrium effort distribution upwards by the amount of the head start, whilst that 
of the weaker player is unchanged. Hence, the stronger player has an increase in 
effort that offsets the head start, and this increase accrues to the contest organizer.3 
The logic behind the result of Li and Yu (2012) points to one of the mechanisms 
at work in our story: while the principal cannot manipulate the head start directly, 
he can affect the (continuation) valuations of the players of winning by a judicious 
division of the prize mass across contests. The principal must seek to balance out 
the valuations and the head start over the course of the two contests, and the design 
3 Franke et al. (2018) extend this to the case of several players, and where a head start may be combined 
with a bias term that amplifies the efforts of players in the contest success function. In this case, the head 
start can be used first to exclude players, and then to induce revenue-maximizing behavior among those 
who are left.
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problem is not trivial. In setting the stage prizes, the principal must be mindful of 
the fact that the relationship between the head start and the prize in a stage contest 
will determine whether the players will exert effort, or if one player gives up, as well 
as the magnitude of efforts. The fact that the principal can directly take actions that 
lead a player to give up completely is an interesting knife-edge problem that has not 
previously been examined. The principal must also take account of how the head 
start will evolve for various outcomes of the first contest.
Critical for our results is the relative ability of the initial laggard to turn a win 
into a head start. The main case that we consider involves each player getting a posi-
tive boost from winning the first contest. We find that, when the laggard gains a 
small head start following a win, the principal’s optimal choice is to spend all the 
money in the first contest, which in practice means running only that contest. Gain-
ing a small head start does not incentivize the laggard to exert much effort in the first 
contest, and also the leader can then slack off. If the laggard can gain a sufficiently 
large head start before contest two, the principal prefers to run two contests. How 
much surplus he can extract from the players depends on the extent that the initial 
laggard can turn a win into a head start; we show when expected effort is increasing 
in this parameter, and when the whole prize fund is dissipated.
A further case that we consider is when the initial leader, because of decay, ends 
up with a head start following a first contest win that is positive, but still smaller 
than his initial head start. Now it is the case that the principal will always prefer to 
run two contests, and for a large potential head start for the initial laggard, the previ-
ous results go through. When the head starts in the second contest are small, how-
ever, the heterogeneity between the players is reduced; since heterogeneity leads to 
lower expected effort, the principal puts the whole prize fund into the second contest 
since it is more even. The first contest is fought purely for position.
Clark and Nilssen (2018) have looked at win-loss dynamics in a long series of 
contests with a common stage prize and ex-ante symmetric contestants. Ex-ante 
symmetry implies that the whole of the rent is dissipated, so that the design problem 
considered in the current paper does not exist there; rather, they consider situations 
in which the lagging player will give up, and those in which he will fight intensely 
to reduce the size of the disadvantage. Clark and Nilssen (2020) consider a similar 
design problem to this paper, but with a productivity bias instead of a head start.4 
Some results for full rent dissipation are achieved for competitions longer than two 
rounds in that paper, since one does not meet the possibility of zero efforts in any 
stage game; the knife-edge problem is hence not a complicating issue in that paper.5
4 Clark et  al. (2020) also discuss a design issue similar to ours: how to distribute the prize fund over 
time; but they do it in the context of Tullock contests with symmetric players. Different modeling 
assumptions can of course be made to analyze the design issue that we address.
5 A phenomenon related to the win effect that we consider here are dynamic effort effects, where efforts 
in an early contest, rather than winning it, give a player benefits later on. Clark and Nilssen (2013) inter-
pret this as learning by doing in a two-stage contest model. Kovenock and Roberson (2009) model a 
dynamic advantage as a function of a player’s past net effort, i.e., his effort over and above that of the 
other player. A high net effort in the first contest will, with some decay, give a player a head start in the 
second. The margin of victory is important in the early contest, whereas the amount of advantage that 
can be gained from winning in our model is independent of previous efforts.
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This paper is organized as follows. The model framework is presented in Sect. 2, 
and the solution and main result in Sect. 3 . We then consider in Sect. 4 how the 
results are affected when the head start for the initial leader can be reduced after 
he wins the first contest. Section  5 concludes. All proofs are contained in the 
“Appendix”.
2  The model
A risk-neutral principal has a prize fund of size 1 to distribute among two risk-neu-
tral contestants. He does this by setting up two consecutive all-pay auctions with a 
prize of 1 − v available in the first and a prize of v in the second, where 0 ≤ v ≤ 1.6 
In the first contest, we assume that one of the players—player 1 without loss of gen-
erality—has a head start h ∈ (0, 1) , which means that this player can win the contest 
with less effort than the rival. Specifically, we assume the following contest success 
function for player i = 1, 2, in contest 1, given efforts xi,1:
The winner of the first contest gets not only the stage prize 1 − v , but also a net head 
start in the second. This net head start captures different situations that can arise 
after the first contest. A win by the initially favoured player 1 that leads to a larger 
head start in contest two indicates that he has received a positive momentum from 
winning; if the net head start is lower than in contest one but still positive, then he 
remains the favorite, but the initial lead has decayed or been reduced due to fatigue. 
If player 2 wins the first contest, two possibilities arise: a positive net head start for 
this player means that winning has allowed him to overtake the head start of the 
initial winner; a negative net head start for player 2 indicates that winning has made 
him catch up some, but not all, of the initial lead.
Denote by zi the net head start in contest two of player i who has won the first 
contest. Should player 1 win the first contest, he gets the head start z1 > 0 in con-
test two; by assuming that the head start of player 1 is positive following a win, we 
ensure that he maintains some momentum from contest one to two. If z1 > h then he 
has augmented the initial lead, becoming more of a favorite in contest two.7 On the 
other hand, if h > z1 > 0 , he still has an advantage at the beginning of the second 








1 if h + x1,1 > x2,1
1
2
if h + x1,1 = x2,1









7 The second contest head start may be a function of the initial head start h ; alternatively, it can be an 
exogenous constant.
8 As discussed in the introduction, this could occur due to fatigue, although we do not consider extreme 
situations in which the fatigue makes him a laggard in the second contest.
6 The principal may choose to award the prize in a single contest, in which case v = 0.
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contest with effort x1,2 , player 1 has a contest score of z1 + x1,2 ; the score of player 2 
will simply be his effort in contest two, x2,2.
Should player 2 win the first contest, his head start in the second one modifies 
his effort x2,2 by z2 , giving him a contest score of z2 + x2,2 ; player 1 in this case has 
a second-contest score of x1,2 . If z2 > 0 , then player 2 becomes favorite in contest 
two. If z2 < 0 , then player 1 has lost the first contest, but retains a lead going in to 
the second; it is natural, however to assume that some of the lead has been eroded 
by player 2 winning the first contest, so that ||z2|| ≤ h in this case. The second-contest 
score of player 1 will then be x1,2 , while player 2 has a score of x2,2 + z2 < x2,2 , with 
0 > z2 ≥ −h.9
No efforts are carried over from the first contest to the second. The player with 
the largest score in contest two is designated the winner of that contest, gaining the 





 indicate the win probability for player i in the second 
contest, given that player j has won the first, i, j ∈ {1, 2}.
and
In what follows, we shall suppress the effort arguments in the probability functions, 
writing simply pi,2(j).
Similarly, denote by i,2(j) the expected payoff function of player i in the second 
contest, given that j has won the first, i, j ∈ {1, 2} . Then
since the loser gains 0 in this final contest. Hence, contest two is an all-pay auction 
with common valuations, and with a head start to one of the players (determined by 
the outcome of the first contest). Contest one, on the other hand, is an all-pay auc-
tion with a common stage prize, continuation values that depend on the course of 
play, and a head start of size h to player 1. Denoting the expected equilibrium payoff 
in contest two with an asterisk, we can write the expected payoff function of player i 








1 if z1 + x1,2 > x2,2
1
2
if z1 + x1,2 = x2,2

















1 if x1,2 > z2 + x2,2
1
2
if x1,2 = z2 + x2,1










i,2(j) = pi,2(j)v − xi,2,
9 Equivalently, the score of player 1 can be written −z2 + x1,2 > x1,2 , with x2,2 the score for player 2.
 D. J. Clark, T. Nilssen 
1 3
where
Should player i win the first contest, he gains the stage prize 1 − v and the payoff that 
the contest-one winner expects in the second contest, ∗
i,2
(i) . If player i loses the first 
contest, then he gains no stage prize and expects ∗
i,2
(j) in contest two. Wi,1 is thus a 
measure of what player i has to fight for in the first contest.
Lemma 1 in Section A1 in the “Appendix” gives the general solution of an all-
pay auction with asymmetric valuations and a head start. Effort in such a contest is 
driven by the relative size and direction of the difference in the contestants’ valu-
ations and the head start to the advantaged player. Consider contest two in which 
there is no difference in the players’ valuations of winning. If the head start of the 
favored player in contest two is at least as large as the value of the second-contest 
prize, then the laggard will never find it profitable to exert effort enough to catch up 
the head start. Hence each player has zero effort, and the player with the head start 
wins the second contest. If the second-contest prize is larger than the head start, then 
the players will exert effort chosen from mixed strategies, and each will have a posi-
tive probability of winning. However, only the leader will have a positive expected 
payoff (in the magnitude of the head start), whilst the laggard expects zero.
In contest one, player 1 has a head start of h. If h ≥ W2,1 , then player 2 cannot 
profitably catch up the head start and both players have zero effort with player 1 win-
ning the first contest without effort. Hence, the principal must ensure that the prize 
structure is set so that W2,1 > h in order to get positive effort in the first contest. One 
particularly useful result from the “Appendix” is that, for W2,1 −W1,1 ≤ h < W2,1 , 
total efforts in contest one are
3  Optimal prize division
Given the structure of the game, the principal wishes to distribute the fixed budget 
between the two contests in order to obtain the most expected effort in aggregate. 
Effort in the first contest is affected by the amount of the asymmetry (h), the stage 
prize, and the value of the continuation payoff which is in turn dependent on the 
potential head starts that each player can achieve. Intuitively, saving more of the 
prize fund for the second contest will increase the efforts in that contest. However, 
the efforts in that contest will also be affected by the direction and magnitude of the 


















(j) + pi,1Wi,1 − xi,1, i ≠ j,
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The two-contest model is solved by backwards induction. A key ingredient is 
Lemma 1 in Section A1 in the “Appendix”; this considers a static all-pay auction 
where player 1 has a head start of Δ > 0 , and the players value the prize at V1 and 
V2 , respectively. It is shown that, if V1 − V2 + Δ > 0 , then player 1 expects a payoff 
in equilibrium of exactly this size, and player 2 expects zero; if, on the other hand, 
V2 − V1 − Δ > 0 , then this is the payoff of player 2, and player 1 expects zero. This 
is used to calculate the equilibrium efforts and payoffs in contest two, and then insert 
these into (1). The same method is then used for computing the solution to the first 
contest. In equilibrium, only one of the players expects a positive payoff whilst the 
rival expects zero. Since the size of the prize fund is fixed at 1, the total amount of 
effort in equilibrium can be recovered by subtracting the payoff from the total prize.
Denote Ex∗ as the sum of expected effort by both players in both contests. We first 
consider the case in which a win by the initial leader gives him a greater net head 
start in the second contest than he had in the first. The following Proposition solves 
for the optimal division of the principal’s budget between the two contests.
Proposition 1 Consider a sequence of two all-pay auctions with two players and a 
total prize budget equal to 1, so that the prize in the second contest is v ∈ [0, 1] and 
the prize in the first contest is 1 − v . Let player 1 have a head start in contest one of 
h ∈ (0, 1) , and let player i’s net head start in contest two be zi if he won contest one, 
for i ∈ {1, 2} , where z1 ∈ (h, 1) , and z2 ∈ [−h, 1) . A principal who wants to maxi-
mize total expected effort over the two contests should set v as follows: 
 (i) If −h ≤ z2 ≤ 0 , then v = 0 is optimal, and Ex∗ = 1 − h.
 (ii) If 0 < z2 ≤ z1 , then any v ∈ [0, z2] is optimal, and Ex∗ = 1 − h.






 (iv) If h + z1 ≤ z2 < 1 , then v = h + z1 is optimal, and Ex∗ = 1.
Note that we, in Proposition 1, put upper limits on the head starts in contest two 
that ensure that the prizes in parts (ii), (iii), and (iv) are less than the budget limit of 
1 and that the total expected effort in part (iii) is positive.10
In case (i), even if player 1 loses the first contest, he still has a head start in con-
test two, albeit reduced compared to the initial situation. In the other cases, it is the 
winner of contest one that has the head start in contest two.
Proposition 1 delineates cases when the principal can influence the players by 
the budget division, and when this is not possible. Key for the result is the extent 
to which the contest-one laggard can use a win to build a head start over the initial 
leader. If player 2, following a win in contest one, achieves less of a head start in 
contest two than player 1 , then case (i) or case (ii) occurs and the principal gets the 
level of expected effort that can be achieved in a single all-pay auction with a prize 
10 In part (iii), it can be the case that h + z1 > 1 , though. However, expected effort will be in the range 








> 1 − h > 0.
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of 1 and a head start of h. When the initial leader retains some advantage even if 
he loses the first contest (case i), the principal does not want to incite effort in both 
contests, preferring to run a single contest ( v = 0 ) and getting the amount of effort 
1 − h.11 Case (ii) illustrates that this effort level can also be achieved by running two 




 ; if it 
is costly to run several contests, then a single contest is preferred.
Achieving more effort in expectation than this is dependent on player 2 develop-
ing a sufficiently large head start following a win, as shown in cases (iii) and (iv), 
with the latter providing the most striking result. Not only can the principal use the 
budget division to even out differences between the competitors, it can be done in 
such a way as to dissipate the whole value of the prize. In case (iv), the initially dis-
advantaged player has a potential head start in the second contest that is larger than 
the sum of the head starts achievable by player 1: z2 ≥ h + z1 . A judicious setting 
of the prize division, saving v = h + z1 for the second contest, allows the principal 
to balance the first contest in spite of the initial asymmetry due to the head start. 
The disadvantaged player has more to fight for—as outlined in detail below—which 
makes him exert a high level of effort in spite of lagging behind at the start; this 
incites the advantaged player to exert effort also, and in sum the expected efforts 
equal the total value of the prize budget. When this is not possible, the principal can 
still achieve more effort in expectation than a single contest as long as the potential 
head start to player 2 in contest two is larger than that of the rival: z2 > z1 (case iii).
Figure  1 illustrates the connection between the potential head start of player 2 
and the total expected effort over the two contests. Whilst we have set up the pos-
sibility that the principal may use two contests in order to solicit the most effort, 
it is fully possible to award the whole prize in the first one. As noted above, total 
expected effort here is 1 − h , which forms a minimum effort that the principal seeks 
to increase by manipulating the prize instrument. This is only possible when a win 
for player 2 gives a sufficient leap past player 1 in terms of head start, should player 
2 win the first contest. From Fig. 1, it is clear that if player 2 can at least catch up the 
rival’s head start ( z2 > z1 ) then the principal can achieve more expected effort than 
1 − h , and the whole surplus is captured for z2 > h + z1 . If the head starts of player 1 
are too large in sum ( h + z1 > 1 ), then the full dissipation result cannot be achieved, 
and case (iii) gives the best possible solution for the principal.
Figure 2 depicts the optimal prize v∗ in the second contest, as well as the types 
of contest behavior that one may see there. The proof of Proposition 1 relies in 
part on looking at the patterns of behavior that can arise in each contest. If there 
is no effort in contest one, then player 1 wins 1 − v and gets a head start in contest 
two of z1 . In contest two, each player has the same valuation of the prize, and 
efforts are 1 − z1 . Since z1 ≥ h , this is not greater than what can be achieved by 
running a single contest with v = 0.12 This means that we can limit the search for 
optimal budget divisions to cases in which there is effort in the first contest. We 
delineate four cases depending on the second contest: 
12 Proposition 2 below considers the case when z2 < h.
11 To see that a single contest with common prize 1 gives this effort, set W1,1 = W2,1 = 1 in (2).
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(A) Effort in contest two whoever wins the first;
(B) No effort in contest two;
(C) Effort in contest two only if player 2 has won the first;
(D) Effort in contest two only if player 1 has won the first.
The areas A, B, C, and D are marked in Fig. 2. If player 1 wins the first contest, 
then there will be effort in contest two as long as v > z1 ; effort in contest two is 
ensured following a win by player 2 if v > z2 . In the areas marked by A in Fig. 2, 
both of these inequalities hold, and there is effort in contest two whoever wins the 
first. In area D, z2 > v > z1 , and effort will only be made in contest two following 
a win by player 1. Cases B and C can occur also when z2 < 0 , so that the lead 
of player 1 is reduced but not overturned following a win by 2. When v < z1 , no 
effort is made following a win by player 1; if v is below the line marked v = −z2 
for z2 < 0 , or below v = z2 > 0 , there is no effort in contest two following a win 
by player 2. Hence, area B gives parameter combinations that give no effort in 
the second contest whoever wins the first. The remaining area C is such that there 
will be effort in contest two only after a win for player 2.
In Fig. 2, the optimal second-contest prize v∗ can be seen for each of the cases 
of Proposition 1, depending on the propensity of player 2 to turn a win into a 
head start as measured by z2 . When player 2 is the underdog in contest two even 
if he wins the first ( −h < z2 ≤ 0 ), then v∗ = 0 , which is case (i). The principal’s 
optimal choice in cases (ii) and (iii) is a range of contest-two prizes, represented 
by the checkered areas in Fig. 2; if player 1 stands to gain a larger head start from 
a first contest win than player 2, then the second contest prize is limited. If player 
2 has the larger potential head start in contest two, then higher prizes are used 
Fig. 1  Total expected effort
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in contest two, and these give incentives to effort above the single contest case. 
Finally, when player 2 can potentially build a big lead, z2 ∈ [h + z1, 1) , the opti-
mal second round prize follows a specific rule given by v∗ = h + z1 ; this is case 
(iv) of the Proposition.
For low values of the potential head start for the disadvantaged player 2, 
z2 ∈ [−h, z1) , the principal can do no better than run a single contest. In the other 
cases, it is interesting to consider how much of the prize fund is saved for contest 
two. In case (iii), a range of possibilities occurs since the principal can choose the 
second-contest prize from an interval. In the extreme, he can distribute the whole 
prize mass in the second contest, so that the first is simply a contest for position. 
In case (iv), the prize must be set at a certain level in order to gain the maximum 
level of total expected efforts; the rule is simple, since the value of the second 
contest prize is just the sum of the head starts that the advantaged player 1 can 
achieve. The larger the sum of head starts for this player, the more of the prize is 
saved for the second contest.
The most striking result is contained in case (iv), since this represents full 
prize dissipation despite the initial heterogeneity between the contestants and the 
different ways in which this heterogeneity can evolve over the two contests. The 
optimal prize structure here induces effort in contest two only if player 1 wins the 
first. In the proof of Proposition 1 in the “Appendix”, we show, for this case, that 
the initial head start of player 1 is completely cancelled out by the induced dif-
ference in the players’ valuations in the first contest: h = W2,1 −W1,1 , and hence 
Fig. 2  Optimal second contest prize
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neither player expects a positive surplus.13 With a prize of z1 ≤ v ≤ z2 in contest 
two, the players exert effort in that contest only if player 1 wins the first, in which 
case the players compete for the same prize (v) in contest two; player 1 expects 
a second-contest payoff of z1 , and player 2 expects zero. Hence, total expected 
effort in the second contest, by part (ii) of Lemma 1 in the “Appendix”, equals 
v − z1 . Seen from the first contest, player 1 has a value of winning of 1 − v (the 
stage prize in the first contest) plus z1 from contest two: W1,1 = 1 − v + z1 . Player 
2 wins the second contest with certainty if he wins contest one, gaining prize v, 
and winning contest one gives a stage prize of 1 − v , so that: W2,1 = 1 − v + v = 1 . 
Hence W2,1 −W1,1 = v − z1 . Putting these values into (2) reveals that total effort in 
contest one is increasing in v. Hence, v should be set as high as possible in case 
(iv): v = h + z1 . Then the induced prize spread is equal to the initial head start, 




 . The probability of positive effort in the second contest is the probabil-
ity that player 1 wins the first, which from part (ii) of Lemma 1 is 1−h
2
 ; and with 
v = h + z1 , we have an expected effort in the second contest of h. Hence, total 





= 1 . The principal captures all of the surplus 
in this case.14
In case (iii) of Proposition 1, it is still beneficial to run two contests, although this 
does not lead to full dissipation of the prize. The second-contest prize is optimally 
set sufficiently high that there will be effort in contest two, irrespective of who wins 
the first, v ∈ [z2, 1] . The winner of the first contest will thus have a positive expected 
payoff in contest two. The value of winning the first contest is hence, for each player, 
the stage prize 1 − v plus the expected payoff in contest two: W1,1 = 1 − v + z1 , and 
W2,1 = 1 − v + z2 . Player 2 has more to gain, since W2,1 −W1,1 = z2 − z1 > 0 ; how-
ever, it is not possible to set the induced first-contest prize to completely even out the 
initial heterogeneity since h > W2,1 −W1,1 when we are in case (iii). Total expected 




+ z2 > 1 − h from a single contest; the inequality holds when 
z1 > z2 , which is true in case (iii).
In cases (i) and (ii) of Proposition 1, it is not possible to improve on a single 
contest. In case (i), player 1 has a head start in the second contest even if the rival 
wins the first. In contest two, player 1 will have a head start of z1 or −z2 . With a 
second-contest prize v < −z2 < z1 , player 2 will not find it worthwhile to fight, 
and player 1 wins v with no effort in contest two. Hence, the total effort would 
come simply from the first contest. In contest one, the players fight over the same 
prize 1 − v , since the payoff in contest two is not affected by who wins the first. 
Given that player 1 has a head start of h, total efforts are 1 − v − h , which is maxi-
mized for v = 0 , so that the principal runs a single contest.
14 Capturing the whole surplus is equivalent to the principal ensuring that each player has 
an expected payoff of zero. This is the case here, since the expected payoff to player 1 is 
W1,1 −W2,1 + h = 0 = W2,1 −W1,1 − h , where the latter expression is the expected payoff of player 2.
13 Li and Yu (2012) show that expected efforts in a single contest are maximized when the head start is 
set at the difference between the valuations of the two players. In our analysis, the head start is fixed, so 
that balance and full rent dissipation are achieved by adjusting W1,1 and W2,1 through the budget division.
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The intuition for case (ii) is broadly similar, although now it is the winner of 
contest one that will have the head start in contest two. Player 2 has the lower pos-
itive head start in contest two if he wins contest one, since z2 < z1 in this case. By 
the same reasoning as above, setting a prize of v < z2 in contest two will induce 
no effort in that contest, and the winner of the first contest wins also the second-
contest prize v. Seen from the first contest, the value of winning is (1 − v) + v = 1 
for each player, and hence total efforts are 1 − h given the initial head start. Any 
second-contest prize up to z2 will achieve this result, since no prize in this range 
induces effort in contest two.
Note that Fig. 2 is also valid if h = z1 , so that player 1 retains the same head 
start following a win. Proposition 1 is unchanged in this case, except for the fact 
that, at z2 = z1 = h , any v ∈ [0, 1] gives the amount of effort 1 − h = 1 − z1.
4  Advantage decay
Proposition 1 considers the case in which a win by the advantaged player 1 leads 
to him building upon his initial head start which then increases in contest two. 
There are situations in which one can think of the second contest advantage as 
being reduced in relation to that of contest one. One instance may be fatigue, so 
that player 1 retains an advantage at the beginning of the second contest which 
is positive, but diminished in size compared to the initial situation. Another pos-
sibility is that the two contests are different in nature, and that player 1 is in some 
way better than the rival in the task of contest one, but 2 is better in contest two. 
A research contest may be divided in two parts, for example, where the first is 
a draft proposal (or a prototype), and the second is a full application (a tested 
product). Player 1 may be a creative team that is expert in idea creation, and 2 is 
better at producing a well-argued application, or finished product. Hence, the ini-
tial advantage of 1 may be eroded in relation to the original lead. In terms of the 
model, h > z1 > 0 . This modifies the results as indicated in the following proposi-
tion which is proved in the “Appendix”:
Proposition 2 In the two-contest series, suppose that z1 ∈ (0, h) and z2 ∈ (−h, 1) . A 
principal who wants to maximize total expected effort over the two contests should 
set v as follows: 
 (I) If −h < z2 ≤ h , then v = 1 is optimal, and Ex∗ = 1 − z1.






 (III) If 1 > z2 ≥ h + z1 , then v = h + z1 is optimal, and Ex∗ = 1.
The striking result here is that it is now always optimal to run two contests. In 
case (I), the first contest is purely for position, with the whole prize mass saved until 
contest two. Heterogeneity is bad for effort, and under the conditions of part (I), the 
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head start in the second contest will be lower in magnitude than in the first. Hence, 
the principal rationally saves the prize for contest two, so that player 1 wins the first 
with no effort and gets a lower head start in contest two. Note that this is valid under 
the condition that h > z1 > 0 . As z1 approaches h from below, it is optimal to exploit 
the fact that there is less heterogeneity in contest two under the conditions in part 
(I) of Proposition 2, setting v = 1 . At z2 = z1 = h this is no longer possible since the 
level of heterogeneity is constant across contests. In this case, any v ∈ [0, 1] is opti-
mal, as indicated in the discussion of Fig. 2.
In parts (II) and (III), the winner of the first contest gets the positive net head start 
in the second, and this is larger in magnitude than the initial head start if player 2 
wins the first. If it is sufficiently large, then full prize dissipation ensues as before. 
Indeed, part (III) of Proposition 2 and part (iv) of Proposition 1 are identical. The 
intermediate cases (II) and (iii) give the same effort, defined over z2 ∈ (h, h + z1) in 
Proposition 2 and z2 ∈
(
z1, h + z1
)
 in Proposition 1.
5  Conclusion
A head start in a contest may reflect a previous investment made by a competitor, 
some technological superiority, or an incumbency advantage. In some situations, the 
initial advantage can be self-amplifying, leading to the Matthew effect where “suc-
cess breeds success”. In a contest setting, this may lead to discouragement of the 
laggard, and a fall in contest efforts. With the same set of contestants and a series of 
contests, we suggest that the head start can adjust over time to reflect previous con-
test outcomes. A win by the initial leader can augment his head start, whereas a win 
for the underdog will reduce the advantage of the leader, or even turn it in favor of 
the initially disadvantaged player.
In this setting, we have considered a design question in which a principal may 
divide up the prize mass in order to maximize the expected effort of the players. 
When the initial underdog has limited ability to turn a win into a future head start, 
the principal can do no better than to run a single contest with the whole prize mass 
on offer. If this ability is sufficiently large, then the principal prefers to run two con-
tests, dividing the prize mass between the two. The design problem would seem to 
be quite complex since the synergy between contests makes the principal mindful 
of the fact that the prize division can lead to contests in which the contestants prefer 
not to compete, and he also needs to take into account the development of the head 
start from one contest to the next. We have shown that a quite simple design can 
increase the amount of expected effort over and above that of a single contest—that 
it can even lead to full dissipation of the prize. This result is also robust to cases 
in which the initial head start of the leading player erodes even if he wins the first 
contest.
Extending the analysis to more than two contests is an obvious, but challenging, 
extension of our analysis. One may also like to consider a combination of a win 
advantage and an effort advantage where some part of previous efforts may affect 
the evolution of the head start; we have simply assumed exogenous win advantages 
here. Nevertheless, we believe that our analysis opens up an interesting design issue 
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in a setting with synergy in the head start between contests in a series. Rather than 
balancing the contest by allowing the principal to choose head starts as in the extant 
literature, we have shown what might be achieved simply by a judicious division of 
the prize mass.
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A Appendix
In order to prove Proposition 1, we first discuss the stage game.
A1 An asymmetric all‑pay auction with a head start
Consider a single all-pay auction in which two risk-neutral players, i = 1, 2 , have 
asymmetric initial scores ( Si ), and different valuations ( Vi ) of winning the prize. In 
the all-pay auction, a player is given a score which is comprised of his initial head 
start and his effort to win the prize: Si + Xi . Without loss of generality, assume that 
S1 ≥ S2 . Define player 1’s head start Δ ∶= S1 − S2 ≥ 0 . The probability that player 1 




 , is given by the following contest success function:








 . The expected util-
ities of the two players can be written as
Let Fi(Xi) represent the cumulative distribution function of player i’s mixed strategy. 








1 if S1 + X1 > S2 + X2
1
2
if S1 + X1 = S2 + X2





Vi − Xi, i = 1, 2
15 See also Li and Yu (2012), Lemma 1.
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Lemma 1 (Clark and Riis 1995). 
 (i) If Δ ≥ V2 , then X1 = X2 = 0 , EU1 = V1 , and EU2 = 0.
 (ii) If V2 − V1 ≤ Δ < V2 , then the unique mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium is 
Expected efforts and win probabilities are
with expected net payoffs
 
 (iii) If 0 ≤ Δ ≤ V2 − V1 , then the unique mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium is 
 Expected efforts and win probabilities are 
 with expected net payoffs 
In terms of our model, the first contest is such that Δ = h , and Vi = Wi,1, i = 1, 2 . 


































































































EU1 = 0;EU2 = V2 − V1 − Δ.
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A2 Proof of Proposition 1
For the purpose of this proof, for i, t ∈ {1, 2} , let player i’s expected equilibrium 
effort in contest t be x∗
it
 , total expected equilibrium effort across the two players in 






 , and total expected equilibrium efforts across contests be 
x∗ . We use the notation in Lemma 1 in determining expected efforts in each stage 
game in the proof below.
Part (i)   By using a single contest with a prize of size 1, the principal expects 
1 − h in total effort.
Since player 1 has a head start in contest two whoever wins the first, V2 = 1 − v in 
contest one. If h ≥ 1 − v , i.e., Δ ≥ V2 , then player 1 wins contest one without effort, 
by part (i) of Lemma . Total expected efforts are therefore the ones in contest two 
following a contest-one win by player 1, which are v − z1 , and this is maximized at 
v = 1 , with total expected efforts at 1 − z1 . This is inferior to a single contest since 
the proposition assumes z1 > h.
If h < 1 − v , then efforts will be expended in contest one. In terms of Lemma 1, 
the expected payoff function of player i in contest one can be written as
In part (i), −h ≤ z2 ≤ 0 so that player 1 has an advantage in the second contest, irre-
spective of the first-round outcome (or the second contest is unbiased if z2 = 0 ). 
This implies that V1 ≥ V2 = 1 − v , and 𝜋∗1,2(2) = ||z2|| > 0 . Using Lemma 1 and (A1), 
the payoff to each player in equilibrium is
With risk-neutrality and linear costs, the total amount of effort expected is equal to 
the prize pot (size 1) minus the expected payoff of player 1:
The two-contest setup gives more effort in expectation than a single contest if
which is not possible, since V1 − V2 ≥ 0 . Hence, it is not optimal to incite efforts in 
the first contest of a two-contest series, and a single contest is preferred ( v = 0).
Parts (ii)-(iv). For parts (ii) through (iv) of the Proposition, we have z2 > 0 , 













 , and ∗
i,2
(j) = 0 . (If player 1 wins 
contest one, and v ≤ z1 , then he wins the contest-two prize of v with no effort; if 
z1 > v , he must fight and has an expected payoff of z1 by Lemma 1).
The choice of v will influence in which contest the players exert effort. We consider 
the different possibilities below, where we denote Effort by E and No Effort by NE. 
[E, NE], for example, denotes effort in contest one and none in contest two. Effort in 













x∗ = 1 − ∗
1,1
.
1 − ||z2|| −
(
V1 − V2 + h
)
> 1 − h ⇔ −||z2|| >V1 − V2,
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the second contest can be conditional upon who has won the first contest. If the second-
contest prize is above the highest head start in contest two, then there will be efforts 
in contest two whoever wins contest one; if the prizes in contest two lies between the 
highest and lowest head start, then there will be effort in the second contest only if the 
player with the low second-contest head start wins the first. We denote this possibility 
by EC(i) below, where i = 1, 2 is the identity of the player with the lowest head start in 
contest two. (Note that it is not possible to achieve effort in the second contest if the 
player with the high second-contest head start won the first).




> v ≥ 0 , then there will be no effort in contest two. 
The player who wins contest one gets the prize 1 − v and the head start in contest 
two, thus gaining v with no effort. Hence, V1 = V2 = 1 − v + v = 1 , and total effort is 





(b)  [NE, E]. With effort in the second contest, we have V2 = 1 − v + z2 in contest 
one. If h > V2 , i.e., v > 1 − h + z2 , then there is no effort in contest one, which is then 
won by player 1. In the second contest, we have effort of at most x∗[NE,E] = 1 − z1 
which is less than x∗[E,NE] under the conditions in the proposition.




 , then there is effort in contest two 
whoever wins the first; effort in contest one is secured if V2 > h . Then 
V1 = 1 − v + z1,V2 = 1 − v + z2 . If V2 > h ≥ V2 − V1 , then Lemma 1, part (ii), 
determines the expected payoffs in equilibrium as ∗
1,1
= V1 − V2 + h,
∗
2,1
= 0 . If 
V2 − V1 ≥ h ≥ V2 , then Lemma 1, part (iii), gives ∗1,1 = 0,
∗
2,1
= V2 − V1 − h . The 
amount of effort in this case is x∗[E,E] = 1 −max
{
V1 − V2 + h,V2 − V1 − h
}






 . If z2 ≥ v ≥ z1 , then effort is exerted in the second contest if and only 
if player 1 wins the first. Thus, if player 2 wins the first contest, he wins the sec-
ond one without effort, getting 1 − v from winning the first and v from the second: 
V1 = 1 − v + z1,V2 = 1 . As in case (c), either player 1 or 2 can expect a positive pay-






V1 − V2 + h,V2 − V1 − h
}
 which gives





= 1 . If h + z1 > z2 , then this level of effort cannot be obtained, and the 








 , which is maximized by 













 occurs for z1 ≥ v ≥ z2 , giving V1 = 1 and V2 = 1 − v + z2 in contest 
one. Since V1 − V2 ≥ 0 , Lemma 1 determines that player 1 gets a positive expected 
payoff, and efforts are
In the interval for v, this expression is maximized by choosing the second contest 

































= 1 − v − h + z2.
 D. J. Clark, T. Nilssen 
1 3
Finding the optimal v involves comparing conditions under which the efforts in (a) 
through (e) are largest for z2 > 0 . Note that, since z1 > h , case (b) cannot be optimal 
and can be discounted. Expected effort is equal to the prize mass in case (d), and 
this solution is permitted for z2 ≥ v = h + z1 ≥ z1 , which implies z2 ≥ h + z1 . This 
is part (iv) of the proposition. When h + z1 > z2 , the minimum condition in case (c) 




+ z2 (which is the same as case (d) for this parameter 





+ z2 ≥ 1 − h , i.e., if z2 ≥ z1 . Hence, for h + z1 > z2 ≥ z1 , the maximal 









where the closed lower bound comes from case (d). This is part (iii) of the proposi-
tion. When h + z1 > z1 ≥ z2 > 0 , it follows that the maximum amount of effort that 
can be obtained is 1 − h . From cases (a) and (e), this can be achieved by setting any 
v ∈ [0, z2] . This is part (ii) of the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 2
Part (I)   Suppose first that −h < z2 ≤ 0 , which implies that player 2 expects zero 
in contest two whoever wins the first one, and hence V2 = 1 − v . If h ≥ 1 − v , i.e., 
Δ ≥ V2 , then player 1 wins contest one without effort, by part (i) of Lemma 1. Total 
expected efforts are therefore the ones in contest two following a contest-one win by 
player 1, which are v − z1 , and this is maximized at v = 1 , with total expected efforts 
at 1 − z1 . This is better than using a single contest, since the proposition assumes 
h > z1.
If h < 1 − v , then there are efforts in contest one. As in the proof of Proposition 1, 
part (i), expected effort in this case is 1 − ||z2|| −
(
V1 − V2 + h
)
= 1 − ||z2|| − z1 − h . 
For this to give more effort than saving the whole prize for the second contest, we 
need 1 − ||z2|| − z1 − h > 1 − z1 , which cannot occur. Hence, it is optimal to set v = 1 
and get effort 1 − z1 in this case.
Optimal prize division in part (I), for h ≥ z2 > 0 , and parts (II) and (III) 
involves comparing the efforts that can be achieved from the combinations [E,NE] , 








 outlined in the proof of Proposition 1. As 








 , and 
x∗[NE,E] = 1 − z1 , where the latter holds for v = 1 . Under the conditions of this 









= 1 by setting v = h + z1 for z2 ≥ h + z1 . 
This is part (III) of the proposition.




+ z2 , and hence 





 , and this is part (II) of the proposition.
It follows that x∗[NE,E] = 1 − z1 is the most effort that can be achieved when 





= 1 − h.
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